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This Article considers various factors affecting the
competitiveness of U.S. capital markets in comparison to
foreign markets as offered in recent reports by the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, McKinsey &
Co. (commissioned by the City of New York), and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. We then consider the
recommendations offered by these groups to improve the
competitiveness of U.S. securities markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today's global economy provides companies seeking to raise
capital with many options. In recent months, the costs and risks that can
accompany listing in the U.S. have motivated debate whether the U.S.
markets are losing a competitive edge in attracting both foreign issuers as
well as smaller U.S. issuers who may be considering listing on A foreign
exchange.
In response to concerns that the U.S. is becoming less competitive
as a venue for capital formation, several groups have recently produced or
commissioned white papers offering solutions to help the U.S. maintain or
improve its position. Perhaps the most significant of these efforts is that of
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, otherwise known as the
Paulson Committee because of its public support by U.S. Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson.' This 17-member panel was formed in
September 2006 to examine the extent to which U.S. capital markets are
losing competitive ground to foreign and private competitors, the reasons
for such a possible loss, and the potential impact of a loss of
competitiveness on the financial industry and the overall economy.2 The
Paulson Committee's "Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation" (the "Interim Report"), produced in November 2006, offers a
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number of ways to approach competitiveness concerns. 3 Not surprisingly,
the Interim Report advocates for changes in the implementation of Section
404-the section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or
the "Act") which sets out new, and costly, internal controls requirements.
However, the Interim Report stops short of pushing for any wholesale
statutory changes, instead suggesting, among other things, improved
guidance from the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or the
"Commission") and revisions of the materiality standards under Section
404 to ensure that internal control reviews focus on the most significant
risks.4  Another suggestion is to exempt foreign issuers with equivalent
home country requirements from Section 404, and to relax the section's
application to small companies by, among other things, potentially
eliminating the auditor attestation requirement.
Besides addressing Section 404, the report also proposes measures
to improve corporate governance and the current U.S. litigation and
regulatory climate. To help curb the effects of private securities litigation,
the report suggests a cap on auditor liability, a potential safe harbor for
certain audit practices, and limits on damage awards. To reduce the
regulatory burden, the report suggests limiting how and when state
regulators can pursue cases by requiring state authorities to notify the SEC
of their actions and permit the SEC to have the final say on settlements of
potentially national importance.5 The report also suggests strengthening
shareholder rights by requiring boards of directors to obtain shareholder
approval before enacting poison pills, unless the situation involves a hostile
takeover. 6
The report has received its fair share of criticism. Detractors of the
report have suggested that the real motivation behind the report is to protect
underwriters and reduce regulation. Along these lines, many have
questioned the makeup of the committee, as well as its sources of funding.8
While the committee includes academics, the CEOs of two of the "big four"
accounting firms, and executives from the financial services industry, no
former government regulators were asked to serve. 9  Furthermore, the
committee was reportedly financed with a $500,000 contribution from a
nonprofit organization founded by former American International Group
3 COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT (2007), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee Interim ReportREV2.pdf
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT].
4 R. Glenn Hubbard & John L. Thornton, Action Plan for Capital Markets, WALL ST.J.,
Nov. 30, 2006, at A16.
5 Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Financial Rule Overhaul Hits a Nerve, WALL
ST.J., Dec. 1, 2006, at C3.
6 Hubbard & Thornton, supra note 4.
7 Jenny Anderson, Sharply Divided Reactions to Report on U.S. Markets, N.Y.TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2006, at C8.
8 Id.
91Id.
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Inc. Chairman Maurice Greenberg, as well as a $500,000 contribution made
by Kenneth Griffin, the head of hedge fund Citadel Investment Group LLC,
and Wilbur Ross, a private investor. 10
Critics also have taken issue with the report's reference to a
decrease in U.S. IPO activity and an increase in private equity buyouts as
evidence of a drop in U.S. competitiveness.11 According to New York
Governor-Elect Eliot Spitzer, who has referred to some of the report's
recommendations as "absurd," the rise in private equity activity is in reality
attributable to poor management by public companies.12  Furthermore,
while the report assigns much of the blame for the decrease in IPO activity
on U.S. private litigation and regulatory enforcement, critics have pointed
to improving foreign markets as a reason for the loss in IPO activity.
13
Whether decision-makers ultimately will heed many of the report's
recommendations remains to be seen. 4 However, critics' reception of the
report has been much more succinct. "It is very elegant whining," said
former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Richard Breeden.
1 5
In addition to the Paulson Committee, politicians also have voiced
concerns regarding the competitiveness issue. President Bush and Vice-
President Cheney have made public comments suggesting that they are not
satisfied with the regulatory costs imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. Mr. Bush
suggested that he would like to see fine-tuning of Sarbanes-Oxley, while
Mr. Cheney has said that Sarbanes-Oxley may have gone "too far." 16 New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and New York Senator Charles E.
Schumer recently co-authored an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal
on November 1, 2006 titled To Save New York, Learn From London, in
which they squarely addressed the competitiveness concern.1 7 In addition
to his co-authorship of the column, Mayor Bloomberg retained consulting
firm McKinsey & Co. on behalf of New York City to investigate the causes
of foreign issuers' decisions to raise capital outside of the U.S. (the
McKinsey Report),18 with a particular focus on the retention of New York's
status as the global financial services leader.
10 Scannell & Solomon, supra note 5.
11 Anderson, supra note 7.
12 id.
13 id.
14 As discussed in Part IV, infra, the SEC has implemented some of the proposals
recommended by the Paulson Committee, although some proposals may have already
been under consideration prior to the issuance of the INTERIM REPORT.
" Anderson, supra note 7.
16 Cheney Echoes Recent Concerns on Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST.J., Oct. 31, 2006, at
C6.
17 Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, Op-Ed, To Save New York, Learn
From London, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18.
i Aaron Lucchetti & Carrick Mollenkamp, New York to Study Lack of IPOs, WALL
ST.J., Sept. 27, 2006, at C3.
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Finally, the Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets
in the 2 1st Century (the "Chamber of Commerce Committee"), convened by
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, has also recently released
recommendations on improving capital markets competitiveness (the
"Chamber of Commerce Report"). Like the Paulson Committee, the
Chamber of Commerce Committee was composed of a number of
influential academics, former politicians, lawyers, accountants and
businesspeople. 19 Although the Chamber of Commerce Report focuses on
a number of the same issues as the McKinsey Report and the Interim
Report, it notes that "[g]enerally, this Commission sought to add to the
discussion rather than revisit the ground covered by others., 20  Among
other suggestions, the Chamber of Commerce Report recommends that:
public companies stop issuing earnings guidance or, alternatively, move
away from quarterly guidance with one earnings-per-share (EPS) number to
annual guidance with a range of EPS numbers; the government act to
increase retirement savings plans by connecting all employers of twenty-
one or more employees without any retirement plan to a financial institution
that will offer a retirement arrangement to those employees; and that the
government encourage employers to sponsor retirement plans and enhance
the portability of retirement accounts through the introduction of a simpler,
21consolidated 401 (k)-type program.
While a detailed review of these reports is not possible in so few
pages, this paper does attempt to outline a number of the causes of, and
solutions to, the perceived waning of U.S. markets' competitiveness. While
the reports are all quite comprehensive, broad-reaching, and not
significantly redundant in their coverage and recommendations, we focus
on three areas that figure most prominently and repeatedly in these and
other discussions of decreasing U.S. competitiveness: regulatory burdens,
underwriting and listing costs, and litigation risk.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part Ii considers the impact of
underwriting fees, listing fees and trading costs on capital markets
competitiveness. Part III discusses the impact of regulatory costs that factor
into an issuer's decision to list in the U.S., focusing primarily on the impact
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Part IV looks at the risks of private securities
litigation and examines the current trend towards a U.S. class action culture
in Europe. We conclude in Part V.
19 COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, App. 1:
Commissioner Biographies,147-61 (Mar. 2007), available at
http://www.capitalmarketscommission.com/NR/rdonlyres/eozwwssfrqzdm3hd5siogqhp
6h2ngxwdpr77qw2bogptzvi5weu6mmi4plfq6xic7kjonfpg4q2bpks6ryog5wwh5sc/0703
capmarkets full.pdf [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Report].
20 Id. at 5.
21 Id. at 167-69.
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II. INITIAL LISTING COSTS
A. Underwriting Fees
A commonly heard argument 22 is that the U.S. is disadvantaged
because its investment banks charge more than their overseas competitors.
A June 2006 Oxera Ltd. study commissioned on behalf of the London
Stock Exchange entitled "The Cost of Capital: An International
Comparison" 23 ("Cost of Capital Study") points to this pricing differential
as a significant factor in foreign firms' decisions to forego listing in the
U.S. However, a closer look at underwriting fees in the U.S. and abroad
shows a more complex situation.
U.S. underwriters charge a fee for new IPOs at a rate of around 6.5-
247% of total IPO receipts. In comparison, underwriters in Europe charge
25
around 34% of gross IPO receipts. According to the Cost of Capital
Study, this difference in fees cannot be explained by differences in the
quality of underwriting services.2 6 Furthermore, the study points to the fact
that the same investment banks oftentimes charge higher fees for
transactions on U.S. exchanges as opposed to transactions on European
exchanges. 27
However, upon closer inspection, several factors can be seen to
mitigate the higher costs charged by U.S. investment banks. First, the Cost
of Capital Study notes that American underwriters tend to use the more
expensive "bookbuilding technique" in pricing IPOs, while European
underwriters oftentimes use a variety of lower-priced techniques including
auctions or fixed-price offers. 28 This can somewhat justify the higher U.S.
underwriting fees because fixed-price offerings have fallen out of favor in
recent years due to evidence that they may lead to a high level of under-
pricing.29 Furthermore, a study has suggested that U.S. underwriters are
more willing to revise their offer price upwards if there is strong demand.30
In addition to differences in underwriting techniques, IPO expert Jay Ritter,
22 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3 at 6.
23 See LEONIE BELL, Louis CORREIA DA SILVA & AGRIS PREIMANIS, THE COST OF
CAPITAL, AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 40, available at
www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/B032122B-B 1DA-4E4A-B1 C8-
42D2FAE8EBOI0/Costofcapitalfull.pdf.
24 Id. at 4.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 40.
2 Id. at 19.
28 td.
29 Jay R. Ritter, Differences between European and American IPO Markets,
9 EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 421, 426 (2003).
30 Id. at 428 (citing Alexander Ljungqvist and William Wilhelm, IPO Pricing in the
Dot-Corn Bubble, 58 J. OF FIN. (2003) at 723-752).
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a Professor of Finance at the University of Florida, suggests that U.S.
underwriters compete on non-price terms like analyst coverage, market
share and reputation. Professor Ritter highlights the issue of analyst
coverage in a survey of the differences between American and European
IPO markets, suggesting that issuers place such great importance on analyst
coverage that they may be willing to pay higher prices for U.S. underwriters
with "top ranked analysts., 32 A report by TheStreet.com echoed similar
sentiments regarding reputation and its potential ability to allow U.S.
underwriters to charge higher fees, suggesting that IPO clients place such
importance on underwriter reputation that they "tend not to be price
sensitive. 33 Finally, some have suggested that the higher prices charged
by U.S. underwriters are explained in part by the greater securities litigation
risks and regulatory costs that underwriters face in the U.S. 34 The flip side
of the concern over costs and risks incurred by gatekeepers such as
underwriters (under Section 11 of the Securities Act, for example),
however, is the possibility that investors may find these regulations
comforting, and pay, in return, a premium for shares offered in the U.S. that
offsets the higher fees charged by American underwriters.
Although the significantly higher underwriting fees charged in the
U.S. may seem to suggest that the fees may play a prominent role in
issuers' decisions to forego listing in the U.S., underwriting fees may have
little influence. Different pricing and underwriting techniques used by U.S.
banks, the positive analyst coverage that may accompany the use of a U.S.
underwriter, and an enhanced gatekeeper role imposed by litigation risk in
the U.S., all may justify the higher cost of U.S. underwriters. Interestingly,
one article suggests that not much attention was given by issuers to the
higher underwriting fees charged by U.S. underwriters.35 Given that foreign
IPO data have shown a decrease in foreign listings in the U.S. since around
2000,36 it is arguable that the issue would have surfaced much sooner if
underwriting fees played a more significant role in issuers' listing
decisions. Alternatively, however, underwriting fees may play a more
significant role in listing decisions when the differences in the legal
framework, governance and other quality standards on exchanges diminish.
31 Laurie Kulikowski, US 1POs Fork It Over, THESTREET.COM, Sept. 29, 2006,
http://ww.thestreet.com/newsanalysis/wallstreet/10311932.html.
32 Ritter, supra note 29, at 428.
33 Kulikowski, supra note 31, quoting analyst Brad Hintz of Sanford Bernstein.
34 Rob Garver, The Big Get Bigger, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2006, at 90, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7960737.
35 Daniel Gross. Adios, IPOs: Don't blame America's declining IPO business on
Sarbanes-Oxley, SLATE, Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2147063.
36 Luigi Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing Its Competitive Edge? (The
Initiative on Global Financial Markets, Working Paper No. 1, Nov. 2006), available at
http://research.chicagogsb.edu/gfm/research/papers/1LZingalescompetitiveness.pdf.
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B. Underpricing, Listing Fees, and Trading Costs
Although there is not extensive data on their significance, a number
of other factors also appear to impact the listing decision. Among these
factors are IPO discounting, initial and ongoing listing fees, and trading
costs.
Along with the higher underwriting fees discussed above, another
concern with the predominant U.S. method of bookbuilding underwriting is
that the underwriter often causes the issuer to "leave money on the table"
(although in reality, the money is not left on the table, but goes into the pot
of the initial purchasers). IPO underpricing or discounting is seen when an
issue is priced at a modest initial offering amount, but then sees a
significant increase in the price of the security in secondary trading. This
suggests that the issuer could have sold the issue for more than the bankers
priced the shares, and some percentage of the total possible gain has been
taken by the initial purchasers at the expense of the issuer. Several
explanations are routinely offered for IPO underpricing, from the relatively
benign (adverse selection theories, which suggest that because of
information asymmetry the only way to appeal to less informed investors in
the IPO market is to offer the shares at a discount relative to the after-
market price) to the sinister (underwriters seek to reward favored investors
through underpricing in the hope that the investors will hire the
underwriters for other services). Whatever the reason, significant
differences in IPO discounting across jurisdictions will affect the relative
attractiveness of capital raising in those jurisdictions.
As part of its analysis of underwriting differences, Oxera looked at
the underpricing in the U.S. and European markets, finding that there is
significant variation across companies with respect to underpricing.
Discounting seems to be most prevalent on the AIM (11.2%), followed by
Nasdaq (6.6%).3 The London Stock Exchange's Main Market IPOs have
an average discount of 4.4%, which is slightly lower than the discount for
NYSE IPOs (5.1%).38 The smallest discounts were seen on the Deutsche
Boerse (2.6%) and the Euronext exchange (0.8%).39 Notably, however, the
Cost of Capital Study did not see a significant relationship between
underpricing and underwriting fees. Some researchers have suggested that
"prestigious underwriters that charge higher fees may use their reputation
capital to certify the value of the company and thereby reduce investor
uncertainty about the value of the issue. This could lower the level of the
discount and justify the higher fees paid to the underwriter., 40 However,
37 BELL, ET. AL., supra note 23, at 21.
38 id.
39 id.
4 0 Idat 22.
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the study did not find a systematic relationship between the level of
underwriting fees and the initial IPO discount: "For example, the majority
of US iPOs were charged underwriting fees of between 6% and 7% and had
average discounts of 6.89%. This compares with average discounts of
between 3.13% and 7.1% for European IPOs that all had underwriting fees
in the 2-4% range.'
The United States is at a comparative (although perhaps
inconsequential) disadvantage with regard to listing fees. U.S. issuers will
often pay both higher fees at the initial listing stage as well as higher
ongoing fees. Oxera reports that the costs of listing a £100,000,000
company (roughly a $200,000,000 company in U.S. dollars) are lower on
the LSE (£43,390) than either the NYSE (£81,900) or the Nasdaq Global
Market (£54,600). The costs of listing on the AIM are much lower
(E4,180). Note also that the Nasdaq's small cap market, the Nasdaq Capital
Market (£51,870), is also not competitive with the AIM on initial listing
fees. 42
Ongoing listing fees are also higher in the U.S. Again using a
£100,000,000 company for comparison, costs for the LSE (E4,029) drops
quite significantly, the AIM remains at the same cost as the listing fee
(E4,180), while the U.S. exchanges remain relatively higher: NYSE,
£19,110; Nasdaq Global Market, £16,653; and Nasdaq Capital Market,
£11,466 . Given the small overall costs involved, however, the Interim
Report responds that "it is difficult to imagine that [listing costs] would
play a significant role in the decision to list in New York versus London.,
44
Of perhaps more concern is the liquidity and level of execution on
the exchange. Trading costs are relevant to the listing decision because
empirical evidence has demonstrated that the trading costs incurred by
investors in secondary markets will impact a company's share price and its
cost of capital. According to the Cost of Capital Study, the NYSE
continues to enjoy a cost-of-trades advantage over the UK and other
European markets. Nasdaq, perhaps surprisingly, does not.
In the Cost of Capital Study, Oxera analyzed both direct costs
("broker commissions and exchange and other fees",45) and indirect costs
(effective spreads-"i.e., the difference between the price of a trade and the
midpoint of the best-quoted bid and ask prices, just prior to the trade" 46).
The study does not distinguish between LSE Main Market and AIM trades.
The study reports that the total direct costs were lowest on the NYSE (16.1
basis points (bps)), versus 18.8bps on Nasdaq and 40.1 bps on the LSE.
However, Oxera argues that the result is skewed by the impact of stamp
41 id.
42 Id. at 24.
43 Bell, et. al., supra note 23, at 25.
44 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 49.
45 Bell, et. al., supra note 23, at 28.
46 ,,
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duty on LSE trades: "Stamp duty is a transaction tax that applies to dealing
in UK equities. The charge applies at a 0.5% rate on all purchases of UK
equities unless a specific exemption applies-e.g., intermediaries such as
market-makers are exempt from stamp duty." 4 However, "overseas issuers
are subject to stamp duty only if they have a register in the UK. In other
words, stamp duty payment is associated with the geographic location of
registration, rather than the location of listing and raising capital. '4 8 When
stamp duty costs are excluded, "the direct trading costs were between
0.7bps and 3.4bps lower on the LSE than on the other exchanges examined
in this study."49 With respect to indirect costs, however, which effectively
measure liquidity, the NYSE leads significantly: 7.4bps versus 10.1 on the
LSE and 11.9 on Nasdaq. Because of this liquidity advantage, the NYSE
still offers the best performance in terms of trading costs, even excluding
stamp duty, with total trading costs of 23.5bp, followed by the LSE
(25.5bps excluding stamp duty) and Nasdaq (30.8bps). 50 Interestingly, the
study finds that Nasdaq also ranks significantly behind both Germany and
France in total trading costs (27. 1 bps and 27.0bps, respectively). 5'
III. ONGOING REGULATORY COSTS OF THE LISTING JURISDICTION
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
In deciding whether to list in the United States, companies of all
sizes must consider the potential regulatory costs imposed by public
company life. However, because these regulatory costs generally impose a
disproportionate burden on smaller companies, the effect of the regulatory
burden plays a concomitantly higher role for many start-up companies
deciding where to list. The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in the U.S. in July
2002 added new regulatory costs for public companies. These costs have
come to the forefront of a heated public debate regarding the recent trend of
foreign issuers foregoing listing on U.S. exchanges. While the regulatory
costs added by Sarbanes-Oxley have undoubtedly had an impact on listing
decisions, critics have arguably exaggerated the linkage between Sarbanes-
Oxley's regulatory costs and the drop in foreign listings, although
Sarbanes-Oxley has undoubtedly affected capital formation for smaller U.S.
companies. 52
47 id.
41 1d at 29.
49 id.
50 Bell, et. al., supra note 23, at 29.
51 id.
52 See, e.g, Paul Rose, Balancing Public Market Benefits and Burdens for Smaller
Companies Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 707 (2005).
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Some commentators have suggested that Sarbanes-Oxley's passage
has increased corporate accountability, financial transparency and investor
confidence, while lowering the cost of capital.13 However, detractors of
Sarbanes-Oxley have said that the Act is unnecessarily burdensome crisis
legislation, the regulatory costs of which outweigh its benefits.
1. Components of Sarbanes-Oxley
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains a number of provisions that can
potentially affect an issuer's decision of whether or not to go public or to
list in the U.S. These provisions can be broken down into two categories
that appear in the Act itself: enhanced financial disclosures and corporate
responsibility provisions.
Sarbanes-Oxley's inclusion of provisions regarding enhanced
financial disclosure fits with the expressed goal of the Act to "protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures. '54  Section 404 requires the company to provide annual reports
containing an internal controls report, which requires management to
establish and maintain adequate internal control structures and procedures
for financial reporting.55 Furthermore, the section requires an auditor to
attest to, and report on, the internal controls assessment made by the
issuer. 56
Among the corporate responsibility provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley
are provisions that are in essence substantive corporate governance
regulations, a stretch from the U.S. tradition of disclosure-based regulation.
For example, Section 301 directs national securities exchanges to prohibit
the listing of securities of issuers who do not have an audit committee
composed solely of independent directors.57 The committee must also have
the power to appoint, compensate, and maintain oversight over the firm's
auditor. 8 Section 302 requires senior executive officers to certify in
periodic reports that the executives have reviewed the reports, that the
reports contain no omissions or misstatements of material fact, and that the
report fairly represents the financial condition of the issuer. 59 Furthermore,
the executives must certify that they are responsible for establishing and
53 Ernst & Young LLP, Emerging Trends in Internal Controls, May 10, 2006, SEC and
PCAOB Roundtable, at 9, available at http://www.Sarbanes-
Oxley.be/AABS Emerging Trends May2006.pdf.
54 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Preamble, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
in various sections of titles 15, 18 and 28 U.S.C.)
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006).
56 jd.
57 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Section 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-1)(2006).
58 Id.
59 Id. Section 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
20071 CAPITAL MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS: A 449
SURVEY OF RECEATTREPORTS
maintaining internal controls, have examined and evaluated the
effectiveness of internal controls, and disclosed to the auditor and audit
committee all significant deficiencies in the internal controls or any fraud
60that involves management.
2. The Regulatory Costs of Sarbanes-Oxley
As highlighted earlier, opponents of Sarbanes-Oxley have become
increasingly outspoken about the Act's regulatory costs. A look at some of
the cost statistics can help explain why. One study found that audit fees for
S&P 500 companies have risen 63% in the 2 year period since the passage
of Sarbanes-Oxley, from $2.5 billion to $4 billion.61  Another study
estimated a loss of total market value of firms attributable to the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley at $1.4 trillion.6 2 Studies have shown an increase in audit
costs in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era, inversely related to a company's
63
annual revenue. One survey has indicated that the costs of being public
have more than doubled since Sarbanes-Oxley, "rising on average from
$900,000 to $1.95 million, with the increase attributed primarily to higher
audit, insurance, and outside director fees. 64 Lastly, a Foley and Lardner
LLP study conducted in 2003 cited increases in directors' and officers'
insurance, accounting and legal fees, and board compensation as the biggest
components of the increases in compliance costs.
65
While many different provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley have been
blamed for the increase in regulatory costs, the provision that has generated
the most criticism has been Section 404. The provision's requirement of an
annual assessment of the effectiveness of an issuer's internal controls has
been widely regarded as the most controversial section of Sarbanes-
Oxley.6 6 Opponents of Section 404 suggest that in practice the section has
been interpreted far too broadly, costing millions of dollars in expenses and
executive time. One complaint is that companies' executives are forced to
document matters that oftentimes have little to do with the integrity of
60 Id.
61 Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Business Wins Its Battle to Ease A Costly
Sarbanes-Oxley Rule, WALL ST.J., Nov. 10, 2006, at A 1.
62 Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley after Three Years, 15 (U Illinois Law &
Economics Research Paper No. LE05-016), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-746884.
63 Gregory Carl Leon, Stigmata: The Stain of Sarbanes Oxley on US Capital Markets
24-25 (GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 224), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-921394.
64 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1588 (2005).
65 Michael A. Perino, American Corporate Reform Abroad. Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Foreign Private Issuer, 4 EUR. Bus. ORG. L.REv. 213, 231 (2003).
66 jd.
450 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 2:1
JOURNAL
67
financial statements. Another common complaint is that auditors have
become too conservative in performing their Section 404 work due to fear
of SEC or private action if client fraud is discovered. As a result, the firms'
auditor attestations often identify so many essential internal controls that
68they become extremely expensive to implement. One survey found that
companies on average spent $3.8 million to comply with Section 404 in
2005.69
Accounting firms have argued that although Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance entails high start-up costs, these costs sharply decrease within
the first few years following Sarbanes-Oxley implementation. This
reduction is said to occur because of the fact that the greatest compliance
costs are incurred during the first year, when the issuer undertakes the
largest and most expensive efforts to overhaul its systems. After the first
year, compliance costs drop as the issuer's systems are largely in place and
need substantially fewer adjustments. A May 2006 survey by Ernst and
Young LLP found that issuers' total Section 404 compliance costs "fell
nearly 44 percent for larger companies ... and nearly 31 percent for smaller
companies.,, 70 However, a study prepared by Financial Executives
International found that, on average, companies' Section 404 compliance
costs fell 16% from 2004 to 2005, in contrast to a projected drop of 26%. 7
Cost drops aside, the fact remains that Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs
will likely never return to pre-Sarbanes-Oxley levels due to added expenses
resulting from the increased role of auditors in the reporting process.2
Sarbanes-Oxley critics have also pointed to the fact that compliance
costs for small public companies appear to be disproportionately affected
by the Act.13  Recent studies have shown that Sarbanes-Oxley 404
compliance costs for smaller companies as a proportion of revenue are
larger than those of larger companies, in a magnitude of .009 compared
with .0006. 74 This is because the costs of complying with securities laws
and Sarbanes-Oxley have an element of fixed cost that does not vary
proportionally with firm size. 75 Arguably, these fixed costs post-Sarbanes-
Oxley have increased because successful compliance requires significant
assistance from outside attorneys, consultants, and accountants. Besides the
need to look outside the firm for help, many companies have protested that
" Scannell & Solomon, supra note 61.
68 id.
69 id.
70 ERNST AND YOUNG, LLP, EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNAL CONTROLS: MAY 10, 2006
SEC AND PCAOB ROUNDTABLE 3 (2006).
71 Scannell & Solomon, supra note 61.
72 Leon, supra note 63, at 27.
73 Rose, supra note 52.
74 Romano, supra note 64, at 1588.
75 William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of
"Going Private," 55 EMORY L.J 141, 151.
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Sarbanes-Oxley compliance creates the need to spend millions of dollars to
hire employees, install new computer systems, and hire auditors to verify
work.7 6  One study estimated costs of $1,037,100 for software start-up
alone.
In addition to out of pocket start-up costs and professional fees,
Section 404 can affect smaller issuers in more subtle ways as well. For
example, one effect of Section 404 has been to require the separation of
certain executive functions. The effect of this separation arguably can
disproportionately increase costs at smaller companies, where employees
may be more likely to serve multiple roles. 78 The division of roles among
more employees may often require hiring additional help, which adds to
costs.
Further supporting the assertion that Sarbanes-Oxley has affected
smaller companies disproportionately is the increasing number of firms that
79have decided to go private to avoid the costs of being public companies.
One study specifically examined the companies that decided to "go private"
in 2004. The study found that, of those companies who in their filings
specifically mentioned federal securities law compliance as one of the
reasons for their decision, the aggregate securities regulation compliance
costs were $12.2 million, a number representing nearly 51% of total
profits.80 With figures like these, the decision to go private may seem like a
foregone conclusion. The results of the increases in going-private
transactions can be epitomized by the comments of Steve Schwarzman,
CEO of private equity firm The Blackstone Group L.P., who has said
Sarbanes-Oxley "is probably the best thing that's happened to our business
and one of the worst things that has happened to America."81
Critics of Sarbanes-Oxley have also pointed to the recent
emergence of London's Alternative Investment Market ("AIM") as further
evidence that compliance with the current U.S. regulatory climate is too
burdensome for smaller issuers. In 2005, the AIM market accounted for
52% of all European IPOs. 82 Among the aspects of the AIM that add to its
appeal are its limited listing requirements: "no minimum-market
capitalization, stockholder's equity, trading volume, or share price for
76 Scannell & Solomon, supra note 61.
77 Carney, supra note 75, at 148.
71 Id. at 147.
79 Romano, supra note 64, at 193.
80 Carney, supra note 75, at 150.
81 Andy Serwer, Stop Whining about SarbOX!, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 2006,
available at
http:/money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/archive/2006/08/07/8382589/index.htm.
82 Bell, et. al., supra note 23, at 55.
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listing purposes., 8 3 In addition, the process is relatively bureaucrat-free as
the U.K. listing authority does not review or approve AIM listing
documents. This job is left in the hands of "Nominated Advisors," or
"Nomads" for short, which act as reputational intermediaries and ensure
rule compliance. Nomads are typically investment banks or law firms that
charge a fee for their role.
Many Sarbanes-Oxley critics have lumped the success of the AIM
together with the success of the London Stock Exchange ("LSE") when
comparing the success of London to the NYSE's recent performance in
attracting foreign listings. However, the AIM's status as a small company
market necessarily reduces its importance in the debate on the
competitiveness of larger exchanges, since AIM companies would fail to
meet the minimum market capitalization requirements of the LSE and
NYSE, and in some cases even Nasdaq's Capital Market. Furthermore, any
U.S. company attempting to avoid American securities regulations by
listing on AIM will find itself subject to the requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act if it has more than 500 shareholders. 84 Consequently, the
AIM's success cannot be regarded as derogative of the competitiveness of
the NYSE, the Nasdaq Global Market and perhaps even the Nasdaq Capital
Market. What the success of the AIM market does suggest, however, is that
there is a gap in U.S. regulations that has created a difficult situation for
small companies to find good sources of capital. These companies have
increasingly turned to the AIM.
Some commentators have proposed a repeal of Sarbanes-Oxley as a
solution to the various problems presented by the Act.8 5 However, a repeal
of the Act appears very unlikely. In addition to the fact that Democrats
have taken control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate,
even the Republican-led Congress did not indicate a willingness to repeal
Sarbanes-Oxley, despite early signals of its heavy costs. More importantly,
as this paper seeks to suggest, Sarbanes-Oxley is only a part of the overall
competitiveness problem of U.S. markets. Repealing Sarbanes-Oxley by no
means guarantees a return of foreign listings to U.S. markets, as many other
significant factors will continue to impact listing decisions.
Of the three major U.S. reports to address capital markets
competitiveness, the Interim Report provides the most significant
discussion and recommendations with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley. The
drafters of the Interim Report raise (but do not necessarily endorse)
83 Arthur S. Berner, Bryce D. Linsenmayer & Francesca Cinotti, The Alternative
Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange, 10 WALL ST. LAW. (June 2006),
http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/wsl/ws10606.html.
84 id.
85 Larry E. Ribstein & Henry N. Butler, The Sarbanes-Oxley Debacle: What We've
Learned, How to Fix It (Abstract from book published by AEI Press (2006), Illinois
Law & Economics Working Paper No. LE06-017), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-911277.
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arguments that Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley has positively changed the
"'tone at the top' among public companies when it comes to financial
reporting, with a higher level of engagement from audit committees, CEOs,
and CFOs on accounting issues."8 6 The report also refers to observations
that "many of the control weaknesses uncovered in the early years of
Section 404 implementation have led to significant improvements in the
control environment., 8 7  However, the Interim Report also discusses a
number of sensible (but perhaps not novel) adjustments to the
implementation of Section 404.
First, because a central feature of the analysis required under
Section 404 is the detection of "material weaknesses" in internal controls,
the scope of the definition of "material weakness" directly impacts that
regulatory burden of the statute. Accordingly, the Interim Report suggests
that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") reduce
the scope and materiality standards in Auditing Standard No. 2 ("AS2") "to
ensure that reviews are truly risk-based and focus on significant control
weaknesses."" Specifically, the Interim Report recommends that the
definition of materiality in AS2 be revised to say that "a material weakness
exists if it is reasonably possible [as opposed to the existing standard of
"more than a remote likelihood"] that a misstatement, which would be
material to the annual financial statements, will not be prevented or
detected."8 9 The Interim Report also "recommends ... that the SEC revise
its guidance on materiality for financial reporting so that materiality is
generally defined, as it was traditionally, in terms of a five percent pre-tax
income threshold." 90 Ironically, the Interim Report is suggesting a move
from a more flexible principle-issuers should consider whether qualitative
factors may make a quantitatively small deviation material-to a rigid but
more predictable rule-a five percent threshold for materiality. This
recommendation would move the SEC away from its position in Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 99 ("SAB 99"), in which the SEC alerted issuers
that quantitatively small errors (e.g., below a five percent pre-tax income
threshold) may nonetheless be material if qualitative factors are at issue.
For example, the SEC notes that such a small discrepancy may be material
if it masks a trend in earnings, or allows a company to hit an earnings
target. 91 Because SAB 99 gives the SEC an effective means to help police
86 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 115.8 7 Id. at 115-116.
8s Id. at 19 (noting that that the SEC and the PCAOB have already "embraced" this
path).
'
9 1d. at 131.
90 Id.
91 SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 at § 1: "Assessing Materiality,"
http://sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm.
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such deceptive practices, it seems unlikely that the SEC would move away
from its current standard.
Second, the Interim Report also recommends that the PCAOB and
the SEC provide additional guidance to auditors and issuers through
* clarifying and permitting greater judgment as to the auditor's role in
understanding and evaluating management's assessment process;
* confirming that auditors, in attesting to management's assessment, are
not required to perform similar assessments to those needed in issuing
their own opinions;
" reinforcing the appropriateness of the auditor's use of judgment
throughout the audit of internal controls over financial reporting,
including in the evaluation of strong indicators of material weakness;
* clarifying that the auditor attestation does not require the auditor to
report separately on management's own internal control assessment
process ; and
* incorporating the frequently-asked questions guidance into the text of
AS2.9
2
Third, the Interim Report also recommends that the SEC and
PCAOB should allow "multi-year rotational testing" for "lower-risk
components of financial processes and other areas, such as certain elements
of the information technology environment" (rather than a complete review
each calendar year of each aspect of internal controls), as part of an annual
attestation, although the Interim Report notes that "[c]ritical components of
financial processes and higher risk areas such as procedures for preparing
the annual financial statements and related disclosures should be tested each
year.,
93
Fourth, as a reflection of a more "principles-based" focus, the
Interim Report recommends that the SEC and PCAOB should allow
auditors to "increase reliance on the work of others and give guidance to
both management and auditors regarding the auditor's maximum reliance
on inputs from existing sources (for example, internal auditors and
management) in performing their control work., 94  This, the drafters
believe, will result in a more efficient "risk-based" assessment. 95
Fifth, the Interim Report suggests scaling of Section 404 by
continuing to defer application of Section 404 to non-accelerated filers
(companies with less than $75 million of market capitalization) should
continue to be deferred until its proposed changes in materiality, enhanced
guidance, and multi-year rotational testing take effect. At that point, the
Interim Report recommends that the SEC should "reassess the costs and
92 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 132.
93 id.
94 1d. at 132-33.
9 Id. at 133.
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,,96tettabenefits of extending Section 404 to small companies. To the extent that
the SEC finds that, even with the proposed reforms, the costs are still too
high relative to the benefits, the Interim Report recommends that the SEC
"ask Congress to consider exempting small companies from the auditor
attestation requirement of Section 404 while at the same changing the
management certification requirement to one requiring reasonable belief in
the adequacy of internal controls."9 However, the Interim Report does not
recommend that smaller companies be required to merely meet a "design-
only" standard, "under which outside auditors would generally assess the
overall adequacy of the design of controls and only test effectiveness in
limited areas," 98 because the drafters believe that "a reliable judgment
about design cannot be made without testing effectiveness." 99 The Interim
Report comments that "to maintain otherwise risks seriously misleading
investors,"' 0 0 a debatable proposition given that disclosure requirements
could make investors aware of the differences in the level of testing, the
risks of which would presumably be priced into the company's securities.
Finally, the Interim Report recommends that the SEC "not apply
Section 404 to foreign firms that could demonstrate that they were subject
to equivalent home country internal control regulation,"10 1 a view echoed
by members of the SEC staff,10 2 and calls for "more data collection and
ongoing monitoring" 13 of the impact of Section 404.
Generally, the Sarbanes-Oxley recommendations offered in the
Interim Report are measured and politically feasible, although many critics
of Sarbanes-Oxley might argue that the recommendations only alleviate
symptoms rather than cure the disease. Of other, stronger remedies, Yale
law professor Roberta Romano has advanced a promising potential solution
that would ease the effects that Sarbanes-Oxley places on smaller
companies and foreign issuers: a "SOX-by-box" regime. Under SOX-by-
box the controversial corporate governance provisions of the Act would
become default rules that can be opted out of by a shareholder vote. 1
4
Smaller companies could use such a process to free themselves of the
burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley 404. Note, however, that this solution requires
cooperation from the SEC in the form of the Commission using its
exemptive powers under Section 36 of the Exchange Act. As the Chamber
96 id.
97 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 133.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
Id.
102 Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U S.
Investors. A New international Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 31, 61 (2007).
103 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 133.
104 See generally Romano, supra note 64, at 1594-95.
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of Commerce Report notes, there is some uncertainty whether the SEC's
exemptive authority under the Exchange Act would cover such an
exemption for Section 404, which is not part of the Exchange Act.
10 5
Hence, the Chamber of Commerce recommends adopting 404 as part of the
Exchange Act in order to provide a clear path for exemptive relief.
In response to the many concerns expressed over implementation of
Section 404, the SEC has recently reaffirmed its willingness to provide
relief as appropriate. On April 4, 2007, the Commissioners endorsed
recommendations of the Staff to "eliminate waste and duplication in the
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance exercise, in a move that will particularly
benefit smaller companies." 10 6  The SEC has already provided some
guidance to management on Section 404 compliance, 0 7 and has asked the
PCAOB to align its new auditing standards (AS-5) with the SEC's
guidance, "particularly with regard to prescriptive requirements, definitions
and terms."108 As evidence of at least some shift to more principles-based
rules (the wisdom of which is discussed below), the Commissioners also
asked the staff to focus on "scaling the 404 audit to account for the
particular facts and circumstances of companies, particularly smaller
companies, encouraging auditors to use professional judgment in the 404
process, particularly in risk assessment; and following a principles-based
approach to determining when and to what extent the auditor can use the
work of others."' 1 9  Whether this course of action was arrived at
independently or as a result of the recommendations of the Interim Report,
the SEC's efforts should address many of the concerns of the Paulsen
Committee.
3. The SEC's Accommodation of Foreign Issuers
A foreign issuer's decision to list in the U.S. may also be affected
by the current perception that Sarbanes-Oxley has deviated from a previous
tradition of the SEC of making accommodations to foreign issuers. These
accommodations have included the SEC not subjecting foreign issuer
reporting companies to proxy statement requirements and short-swing profit
rules. Following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC has not been
nearly as accommodating. This shift has been said to be in part because the
1o5 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 122.
106 Press Release 2007-62, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Commissioners
Endorse Improved Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation to Ease Smaller Company Burdens,
Focusing Effort on 'What Truly Matters' (April 4, 2007), available at
http://sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-62.htm.
107 Securities & Exchange Commission, Management's Report on Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting and Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports: Frequently
Asked Questions, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/controlfaq0604.htm.108 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission,, supra note 106.
109 ,
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Act unambiguously applies to all issuers that file periodic reports under
U.S. securities laws, regardless of where the companies are domiciled.110
Furthermore, the Act does not contain a single reference to foreign issuers,
suggesting that they are not to be afforded special treatment.' '' Lastly,
some commentators have suggested that the political climate surrounding
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley precluded the SEC from using its powers to
exempt foreign issuers from certain Sarbanes-Oxley requirements. 
11 2
Despite this recent trend against accommodation by the SEC, some
of the latest events suggest that the tide may be turning once again. As
stated in a Price Waterhouse Coopers Securities Litigation study, "the U.S.
spent 2005 extending 'olive branches' to foreign private issuers.''
During 2005, the SEC also extended the deadline for Section 404
compliance by foreign issuers to July 15, 2007, made a one-time
accommodation allowing foreign private issuers to file less detailed
financial data, 1 14 and proposed new rules making it easier for foreign
private issuers listed on U.S. exchanges to de-list. 115 The hope is that this
proposed regulation will attract more foreign private issuers to the U.S. by
easing foreign issuers' concerns regarding the currently onerous de-listing
116process.
Empirical studies that examine the extent to which increasing
regulatory costs have influenced listing decisions of foreign issuers have
been somewhat inconclusive. What has become increasingly clear is that in
recent years the U.S. has attracted a decreasing amount of foreign IPOs. In
2005, 24 out of 25 of the top 25 IPOs were issued on exchanges outside of
the U.S. 117 This figure stands in sharp contrast to the year 2000, when 9 out
of 10 of the world's largest non-U.S. IPOs listed in New York.11 8
Furthermore, only 3 of the top 20 IPOs of 2006 were listed in the U.S."' 9
This declining foreign IPO data suggests that increasing regulatory costs
have tipped the scale towards issuers listing outside of the U.S. However, it
is worth noting that many of the top overseas listings from 2005 involved
110 15 uSC § 7201(7) (2006).
I Perino, supra note 65, at 214.112 Id. at 226.
113 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2005 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 53 (2006),
available at
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/7999A70324592B738525715C
0059A94.
114 Id. at 54.
115 id
116 Id.
117 Allan Murray, Fees May be Costing Wall Street its Edge in Global IPO Market,
WALL ST.J., Aug. 2, 2006, at A2.
118 Corey Boles, London Remains an IPO Drav, U.S. Changes Notwithstanding, WALL
ST.J., Aug. 8, 2006, at C4.
'9 Scannell & Solomon, supra note 61, at Al.
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privatizations of formerly state owned companies like China Construction
Bank, Electricit6 de France, and Gaz de France that predictably listed in
their respective home markets. 120 The decisions to list formerly state
owned companies at home can just as easily be explained as an issue of
national pride, not one of the competitiveness of capital markets.
However popular it may be to blame Sarbanes-Oxley for
decreasing IPO activity, it can also be argued that the decrease in IPOs is
unlikely to last long. One of the major justifications for foreign issuers to
list on U.S. exchanges is to gain access to more liquid capital markets than
are available in their home countries. To the extent that foreign markets
have become deeper and more efficient, U.S. listings may suffer. However,
issuers choose to list in the U.S for reasons beyond pure liquidity.
Oftentimes bonding or signaling is a significant reason for listing in the
U.S. By voluntarily submitting to the U.S. disclosure regime with its heavy
costs of regulatory compliance, an issuer from a country with weak
securities regulation signals a credible commitment that it "will not extract
private benefits of control." 1 21  Consequently, if this bonding effect is in
fact the issuer's primary motivation for listing in the U.S., Sarbanes-Oxley
will not be a factor. This is because as the regulatory burdens of submitting
to the U.S. regime have increased, the signal that bonding conveys may
become stronger and more valuable. 122
The bonding effect will be tested in the coming months, as the SEC
recently proposed rules that allow foreign private issuers to exit the
Exchange Act reporting regime. Under the current rules, a foreign private
issuer may terminate its registration of a class of securities only if its
subject securities were held of record by less than 300 residents in the
United States. The SEC seeks to amend these rules "out of concern that,
due to the increased globalization of securities markets in recent decades as
well as other trends, it has become difficult for a foreign private issuer to
exit the Exchange Act reporting system even when there is relatively little
U.S. investor interest in its U.S.-registered securities." 123  The SEC also
noted that "because of the burdens and uncertainties associated with
terminating registration and reporting under the Exchange Act, the current
120 Murray, supra note 117, at A2.
121 Perino, supra note 65, at 215.
122 Kate Litvak's research on cross-listing premia (the increases in price generally
thought to be attributable to the bonding effect provided by listing in a jurisdiction with
higher regulatory standards) suggests, however, that investors expected Sarbanes-Oxley
"to have greater costs than benefits for cross-listed firms on average, especially for
smaller firms and already well-governed firms." Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L.REv. 1857, 1857 (2007).
123 Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer's Registration of a Class of Securities Under
Section 12(g) and Duty to File Reports Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55540, 17 C.F.R. Parts 200, 232,
240 & 249 (Mar. 27, 2007).
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exit process may serve as a disincentive to foreign private issuers accessing
the U.S. public capital markets."
124
Rather than relying on the number of U.S. securityholders, the new
rules allow eligible foreign registrants to use a benchmark for deregistration
based on U.S. average daily trading volume ("ADTV") relative to
worldwide ADTV. Under the proposed rules, a foreign registrant may
deregister if, during the 12-month period ending 60 days before filing for
deregistration, its U.S. ADTV was 5% or less of its worldwide ADTV,
regardless of the total number of U.S. residents holding its securities.
In a comment that seems representative of practitioners advising
foreign firms, a Clifford Chance partner noted:
One of the SEC commissioners has been quoted as
predicting that there would be no "rush to the exits." I
wish I were as sanguine. I believe that we are about to see
many European companies deregistering their securities,
with a consequent decrease in the access of US investors to
the securities of many fine companies.
Sarbanes-Oxley may not be the only factor that has
made the US less competitive in attracting international
capital-raising, but it has clearly played a significant
role.125
On the potential exodus of foreign issuers, an academic
commentator offers this appraisal:
Most if not all of these issuers will cite Sarbanes-
Oxley to justify the termination of their listing. But don't
always believe it. These issuers originally listed in the
United States for a variety of reasons, and for many a
delisting will simply mean the reasons no longer exist (and
probably haven't for a long time). For example, many a
foreign high-tech company listed on the Nasdaq during the
tech bubble seeking the extraordinary high equity premium
accorded Nasdaq-listed tech stocks. Post-crash, many of
these foreign companies still exist but are much smaller or
have remained locally-based and a foreign listing is no
longer appropriate for them. 1
26
124 Id.
125 Sara Hanks, Letter to the Editor, Sarbox's Role in Lowering US Ability to Attract
Capital, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2007.
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2007), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/05/the coming deli.html.
460 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 2:1
JOURNAL
B. A Move to "Principles-Based" Corporate Governance?
Critics of Sarbanes-Oxley have argued that the rigid strictures of
Sarbanes-Oxley epitomize the inflexibility of U.S. securities regulation.'
2 1
In response to these concerns, the Paulson Committee recommended a
move to more "principles-based" regulation by the SEC and the exchanges,
as exemplified by the "comply-or-explain" approach taken by the UK's
Financial Services Authority (FSA), under which a company is required to
either adhere to a set of government-mandated governance principles or
explain why it has not. As a definitional matter, a comply-or-explain
regime seems inapposite as a reflection of "principles-based" governance:
does making a rule optional thereby transform it into a standard or
principle? What is suggested by the call for principles-based regulation is
not (or perhaps not merely) the adoption of a comply-or-explain approach
by the SEC and SROs, however, but a more fundamental change in the
nature of the regulation, so that regulation is more "risk-based," 128 and
"based on outcomes or results rather than prescribed processes and
inputs." 
129
Interestingly, a "comply-or-explain" approach was already adopted
by the SEC in its implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act with respect to
disclosure of the registrant's code of ethics and whether the audit
committee includes at least one member who is a "financial expert". 30
However, Sarbanes-Oxley generally has been perceived to have increased a
rules-based tendency of U.S. regulation, 131 perhaps most significantly
because it and related exchange regulations set out specific director
independence qualifications. 132 Arguably, this indicates not just a move to
a more rules-based approach, but a related shift in philosophy of U.S.
securities regulation from a disclosure regime to a regime of substantive
regulation which implicates not just securities regulation but corporate law.
Within the realm of the mandatory disclosure regime, "the [U.S.] federal
securities laws have been interpreted as not supporting direct regulation of
corporate governance." 133 However, the director independence rules and
certain other provisions (such as the prohibition on loans to officers) of
Sarbanes-Oxley can be interpreted as a departure from this tradition in that
127 Sridhar R. Arcot & Valentina G. Bruno, One Size Does Not Fit All, After All:
Evidence from Corporate Governance, 3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-887947.
128 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3 at 64.
12 9 
id.
30 See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Securities Act Release No. 33-8177, 79 SEC Docket 1077 (Jan. 23, 2003).
131 See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1149, 1195 (2004).
132 Id at 1212.
133 Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on
U.S. Lav, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 299, 301 (2003).
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they directly prescribe substantive corporate governance regulations. The
substantive corporate governance provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley that trump
state law have led some to believe that Sarbanes-Oxley is the spearhead of a
future federalization of corporate law.
A potential federalization of U.S. corporate law may impact listing
decisions because it represents a potential decrease in flexibility of the U.S.
corporate legal regime, which until now has largely been a creature of state
authority. Professor Romano has argued that leaving corporate law in the
province of the individual states has established a system of regulatory
competition in the U.S. 134  As this argument holds, American state
corporate law regimes have evolved in a manner that is both flexible and
contractarian. State corporate laws are flexible in that they are essentially
default rules; parties can contract around provisions of the state corporate
codes as they see fit.
Sarbanes-Oxley's requirement of certain governance structures,
rather than governance choices, has led to an increased perception that U.S.
law is inflexible, which has arguably impacted foreign listings. Indeed,
some European commentators have already seized the opportunity to
condemn U.S. corporate law as rigid in light of the development of
Sarbanes-Oxley and its substantive corporate governance provisions. These
commentators argue that the flexibility that issuers seek can be found
abroad, and that the U.S. "has an essentially mandatory system of corporate
governance, epitomized by Sarbanes Oxley." 
131
1. Comply or Explain: The UK Approach
Differences between the U.S. regime and the increasingly popular
"comply-or-explain" approach to corporate governance may also affect an
issuer's decision to list in the U.S. The difference between the two
approaches to corporate governance has been brought to the forefront by
the current surge in foreign IPO activity on the London Stock Exchange
coupled with the concurrent drop in activity on the NYSE. European
proponents of the London Stock Exchange have suggested that part of the
explanation for the decrease in listings is a result of the comply-or-explain
approach to corporate governance.
The comply-or-explain approach was introduced in the U.K.
following several corporate scandals in the 1980s. The U.K. established the
approach by introducing a system in which the government introduced a
"Code of Best Practice" which sets out various guidelines of corporate
governance. The approach is rather simple: in yearly reports, companies
134 See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 Yale J. on Reg. 209, 210-11 (2006).
135 Arcot & Bruno supra note 127, at 3.
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must report whether they comply with the Code, and if a company fails to
comply, it must provide reasons for the deviation. Proponents of the
comply-or-explain system argue that it is preferable to the U.S. system
because it is a "concept of principles, as opposed to strict regulation,"
1 36
supporting the view that foreigners consider the U.S. regime as inflexible.
Overall, the system is said to possess greater flexibility than the U.S.
regime because companies are free to tailor their corporate governance
policies to their particular needs. Compliance with the Code is not
mandatory, and the company is free not to comply as long as an explanation
is provided. It is worth noting that the comply-or-explain approach has
picked up a large following internationally, with similar Codes having been
adopted in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, and Sweden.
137
The recent popularity of the comply-or-explain type regime,
coupled with the success of the LSE, may point towards a U.S. adoption of
comply-or-explain type corporate governance provisions as a solution to
decreasing U.S. market competitiveness. In a recent speech in New York,
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson extolled the virtues of a
regulatory structure that is based on compliance with principles as opposed
to prescriptive regulations, saying that principles- based regulations offer
the flexibility to work on compliance with the spirit, not just the letter, of
rules. 138 "Principles-based regulation" is a hallmark description of the
comply-or-explain system. Mr. Paulson's comments can therefore be
interpreted as an endorsement of the kind of principles-based system
embodied by the comply-or-explain approach.
As attractive as a change of U.S. regulations from a prescriptive
regime to a principles-based system may seem, however, other
considerations remain in play. First, the adoption of a federal comply-or-
explain system could divide the ranks of those arguing for "principles-
based" regulation, since a move to a comply-or-explain type regime would
also mean an expansion of federal oversight of corporate governance. If
this is the case, a move towards comply-or-explain could arguably run into
resistance from entrenched supporters of the current corporate law regime.
Second, it is not clear whether a comply-or-explain approach
would, in practice, provide the advertised flexibility. The approach
embodied by recent "comply-or-explain" type provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley suggests that any comply-or-explain provisions in the U.S. may take
on more of a mandatory element than in the U.K. As noted above,
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 406, which requires issuers to disclose whether
136Id. at6.
137 Id. at 6.
138 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson on the Competitiveness of U.S.
Capital Markets at The Economic Club of New York on November 20, 2006, at
heading "Regulatory Structure," http://www.ustreas.gov/press/speeches.html.
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they have adopted a Code of Ethics for senior financial officers, 139 and
Section 407, which mandates disclosure of whether the company has a
financial expert on the audit committee,140 effectively operate as mandatory
rules by shaming the registrant into compliance. Similarly, the UK's
comply-or-explain approach is not without its critics. European detractors
have argued that the comply-or-explain regime of the U.K. is not as flexible
in practice as in theory, with the Combined Code operating as a rather rigid
set of rules. 14 1 This result stems from the fact that for the comply-or-
explain regime to remain flexible, companies who deviate from the Code by
providing an explanation must not be penalized by investors and rating
agencies for doing so. Investors may merely check for compliance without
reading the explanations, thus reducing the effectiveness of the approach.
1 42
A move away from the prescriptive corporate governance
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and other U.S. securities regulations towards
a principles-based regime may offer a partial solution to the U.S.
competitiveness problem. The potential for increased flexibility, lower
costs, and added focus on compliance with the spirit of regulations is
appealing. However, this approach may prove unwise. It is not assured
that the U.S. will be able to transplant these kinds of regulations into the
U.S. regulatory apparatus with ease. Such a system may not operate as
effectively unless coordinated with a centralized governance system, and
transplanting such a system into the U.S.'s current regime could result in a
radical and costly federalization of corporate law.
IV. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS
ON LISTING DECISIONS
Although Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 has been the primary target
for critics seeking to assign blame for the recent foreign IPO decrease, the
risk of private securities litigation in the U.S. may ultimately be the most
significant factor causing foreign companies to forego listing in the U.S.
While receiving more scrutiny as of late, private securities litigation
arguably has not received the attention it deserves when it comes to the
competitiveness issue. Nevertheless, the role of private litigation has been
139 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006).
140 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2006).
141 Financial Reporting Council, Review of the 2003 Combined Code: The Findings of
the Review, at 1, available at
www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Combined / 20Code%/o20review%/o20main
%20findings%2018%20January%202006.pdf.
142 Arcot and Bruno's paper analyzing the stock prices of British companies has
suggested that the U.K. markets have incorporated into prices the effects of complying
with the Code but have not similarly incorporated explanations. Arcot & Bruno supra
note 127, at 24.
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brought to the forefront in the Chamber of Commerce Report, Interim
Report and by Secretary Paulson's recent remarks that "the broken tort
system is an Achilles heel for our economy." 1
43
A look at U.S. securities class action statistics can support
Secretary Paulson's characterization of the American tort system as a
significant drag on public companies in the U.S. While 2005 saw securities
litigation filings drop for the first time in 11 years, statistics from the
previous year show securities class action filings at an all time high.
Evaluating the statistics from 2004 and 2005 in the context of overall
securities litigation in the U.S. over the past several years can help provide
a clearer picture of the future litigation risks facing U.S listed issuers.
A Price Waterhouse Coopers Litigation Study from 2004 reveals a
flood of private securities litigation against issuers listed in the U.S., with
29 foreign companies sued in U.S. private securities class actions. 144 This
number of filings was the highest ever in one year, and represented a 90%
increase over 2003, and a more than 107% increase from the average
number of filings during the seven year period from ranging from 1996
through 2003.145 Furthermore, settlement values were extremely hefty.
The average settlement value during 2004 was $27.6 million, a figure
representing an 18% increase over the year previous. 146 Total settlement
value in 2004 was $5.4 billion, "the highest amount on record" according to
the study.' 4 7 The number of high dollar settlements (amounts of $100
million and up) during 2004 increased 66% from the year before. Finally,
SEC enforcement actions leading to criminal and money penalties reached
all time highs. 148
While the 2004 statistics paint a grim picture of the securities class
action landscape in the U.S., the PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005 securities
class action litigation study shows an unexpected drop in securities
litigation. During 2005 the number of class actions filings fell 17% from
the previous year and 11% below the ten-year average. 4 9 Furthermore, the
number of private securities class actions filed against foreign companies
fell 34%, and SEC enforcement actions against foreign issuers fell as
well. 150  However, despite these positive signs, the average value of
settlements during 2005 increased 156% from $27.8 million to $71.1
143 Deborah Solomon, Treasury's Paulson Warns of Overlap, WALL ST.J., Nov. 21,
2006, at A2.
144 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2004 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 2 (2005),
available at www.pwc.com/gx/eng/cfr/gecs/pwc 2004 seclit study.pdf.
145 Id. at 4.
146 Id. at 7.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 12.
149 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSLLP, supra note 113, at 5.
15Old. at 56.
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million. 151 The increase in both average and total settlement values, as well
as the fact that 2004 was a record year for private securities litigation, led
the survey to conclude that the 2005 drop in both private and public
securities litigation is likely to be temporary.
A study released by NERA Economic Consulting presents similar
figures regarding filings in 2005, but comes to different conclusions.
1 52
The study points out that it is too early to suggest a future downward trend
in filings because the 2005 decrease was not evenly distributed across the
U.S.; most of the decrease came from a drop in filings in the Ninth
Circuit. 153 More significantly, the study predicted that average settlement
values might actually begin to fall, in part because the outcomes of the
majority of the biggest cases associated with the crash of the stock market
bubble have been determined. 154
Mixed trends continued in 2006. Cornerstone Research reports that
only 110 securities class action lawsuits were filed in 2006, compared to
178 in 2005 and an average of 193 for the years 1996-2005.155 When
options backdating cases are removed, only 90 claims were filed in 2006. 156
However, the amount paid in settlements continued to rise. 151 In the years
1996-2005, securities class action settlements averaged $22.6 million.158
Even excluding the $6.6 billion partial settlement in the Enron case, the
average settlement in 2006 was $105 million. 59 The medians between the
time periods differ little-$6.7 million from 1996-2005 versus $7.0 million
in 2006-indicating an increase in the number of"mega settlements. ,160 In
2004 and 2005, for example, seven and nine cases respectively were settled
for $100 million or more, while 2006 saw 14 such cases.16'
151 Id. at 17.
152 See Ronald L. Miller, Todd Foster, & Elaine Buckberg, Recent Trends in
Shareholder Class Action: Litigation: Beyond the Mega Settlements, is Stabilization
Ahead? NERA Economic Consulting Study, (2006). Available at
www.nera.com/image/BRO-RecentTrends2006 SEC979 PPB-FINAL.pdf.
153 Id. at 2.
154 Id. at6.
155 CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS: 2006: A YEAR
IN REVIEW 1, available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse research/2006YIR/20070102-01 .pdf.
156 id. at 1.
157 CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2006 REVIEW
AND ANALYSIS 2, available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW1995-
2006/Settlements Through 12 2006.pdf.
158 Id.
159 id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 3.
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While there is positive news in the most recent securities litigation
surveys, the statistics unquestionably show that there is a significant
amount of private securities litigation risk for firms listed in the U.S., both
foreign and domestic, and this risk in the U.S. undoubtedly remains a
significant factor in listing decisions. Further, even if the risk of securities
litigation has diminished, perception may lag reality.
Highlighting the concerns with securities litigation in the U.S. is
only the initial step in the overall inquiry into private litigation risks. How
significantly a foreign issuer weights U.S. private securities litigation risk
will also ultimately depend on how the U.S. litigation climate compares
with the climate of the issuer's home country. In the U.S., the main
procedural method used to vindicate private securities litigation is the class
action lawsuit. However, securities class actions, and class actions
generally, do not exist in most of Europe, 162 and procedural mechanisms for
securities cases vary worldwide. This fact can make it difficult to compare
American securities litigation to that of other nations. However, examining
some of the mechanisms that have led to the current U.S. litigation climate
and noting their presence or absence in other countries can assist one in
drawing conclusions regarding the possibility of a U.S. style litigation
culture emerging abroad.
In the U.S., most private securities litigation is carried out through
the mechanism of a class action lawsuit, where "individuals with common
interests enforce their rights in a single suit., ' 163  The class action
mechanism is particularly appropriate for securities litigation because there
are likely to be dispersed shareowners with individual damages too small to
merit any one individual's recovery effort. By aggregating the interests of
dispersed shareholders, recovery can be obtained for all. As such, a class
action lawsuit represents the riskiest type of litigation that a company may
be faced with, because of the potential for a massive damages award.
In practice, the U.S. class action system has seen its share of critics.
Among the strongest criticisms advanced is that the system provides
distorted incentives to class action attorneys, creating an agency problem
where an attorney may negotiate a settlement with a defendant for a smaller
judgment and a large legal fee. 164  In addition, attorneys may also be
tempted to bring nuisance value "strike" suits because of the fact that
defendants often choose to settle rather than face high legal costs, ominous
document requests, and negative publicity.
In the U.S., a general sentiment that unrestrained private securities
litigation was harming American business led to the passage of the Private
162 Michael Freedman, Can You Say Tort, FORBES, Dec. 27, 2004, at 124, available at
http://www.forbes.com/global/2004/1220/022.html.
163 Edward F. Sherman, American Class Actions: Significant Features and Developing
Alternatives in Foreign Legal Systems, 215 F.R.D. 130, 132.
164 Linda A. Willett, US.-Style Class Actions in Europe: A Growing Threat? 5 (2005),
available at www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/BRIEFLY-JunO5.pdf.
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Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995165 ("PSLRA"), which consists of
Section 27 of the Securities Act of 1933 and 21D of the Exchange Act of
1934. The PSLRA contains a number of substantive provisions that affect a
plaintiffs ability to bring frivolous federal securities class action lawsuits.
Among the most significant provisions are ones that require the
appointment of a lead plaintiff who has suffered the largest losses,
disclosure of repeat lead plaintiffs, a stay on discovery until the claim
passes a motion to dismiss, attorney sanctions, disclosure of settlement
terms to class members, and restriction on attorney's fees on the basis of
reasonableness. 166
As evidenced by the most recent securities class action litigation
statistics, despite the passage of the PSLRA in 1995, private securities
litigation in the U.S. has continued to present a major threat to U.S. listed
companies. In the decade since the passage of the PSLRA, many critics
have commented that the statute has not produced its intended results, as
the number of securities class actions suits filed has steadily risen. In
addition, the PSLRA rules have been circumvented and in some cases even
blatantly broken, as evidenced by the recent indictment of prominent New
York securities class action firm Milberg Weiss for allegedly paying illegal
kickbacks to lead plaintiffs. When coupled with increasing settlement
values and a steady rise in filings, stories like Milberg Weiss' arguably
show that the PSLRA has at best only produced modest changes in the
highly litigious climate in the U.S.
Having examined some of the perceived flaws in the American
class action compensation system, it is instructive to consider the
procedural mechanisms that drive a litigation regime towards U.S. style
class action litigation, and their presence or absence in regimes abroad.
Two relevant procedural mechanisms have greatly contributed to
the class action culture of the U.S.: the contingency fee and the "opt-out"
provisions of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and the allowance of
punitive damages. The contingency fee, where a plaintiff's payment of fees
is conditioned on the attorney's victory, has been described as "one of the
drivers of class action litigation" 167 because of the incentives that it creates.
In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23's opting-out provision
greatly increases the incentives to bring class action litigation as well. The
provision requires that a member of a potential class action opt-out of the
class or be bound to the outcome of the litigation. 168 In practice, very few
potential plaintiffs opt-out, giving the class action significantly more power.
165 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as additions to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 & 78).
166 Securities Act of 1933 § 27(a)(6), 15 U.S.C.§ 78u-4 (2006).
167 Willett, supra note 164, at 9-10.
168 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
468 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 2:1
JOURNAL
While the abovementioned three procedural mechanisms have
promoted the development of a class action culture in the U.S., several
unique characteristics of European litigation procedure have prevented such
a culture from forming in that region.169 Among these characteristics is the
fact that in Europe, the use of contingency fees has been restricted and civil
trials generally are not brought before a jury, in sharp contrast to the wide
use of juries in civil trials in the U.S. In addition, European Union
members do not allow broad pre-trial discovery as in the United States.
This lack of broad discovery reduces the costs of defending lawsuits for
European defendants and puts another hurdle in front of potential plaintiffs.
However, this factor may be mitigated to some extent by the fact that the
PSLRA significantly restricts discovery. Lastly, most European Union
countries have followed the "loser pays" rule, which can also operate to
discourage litigation by plaintiffs.
A. Class Action Rules Abroad
The recent cases of fraud at Parmalat and Ahold, among others,
have motivated consideration of securities class actions and have likely
contributed to a current trend of European countries taking steps towards
adopting American style class actions. In this regard, France, Germany,
Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands "have either adopted or are considering
[adopting] limited forms of class-action [law]suits."'1 70  This trend
notwithstanding, the concept of American style class actions remains
largely undeveloped in Europe. A country-by-country look at class action
rules of the U.S.' primary competitors further illustrates the uniqueness of
the American private litigation class action culture.
In the U.K, English common law provides for "representative
proceedings." Each member of a class must be identified, and opting-out is
not permitted. Contingent fees are nonexistent (although UK law allows
"conditional fees" where the lawyer receives a bonus if the case is
successful),' 7' and the loser pays rule applies, leading many plaintiffs to
take on insurance policies to cover the costs of a failed case. 172 Limited
169 Adele Nicholas, Class Action Litigation Makes Headway In Europe, INSIDE
COUNSEL, Dec. 1,2005, available at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/issues/insidecounsel/15 169/global views/238-1.html.
170 Mary Jacoby, Courting Abroad: For the Tort Bar, A New Client Base: European
Investors, WALL ST.J., Sept. 2, 2005, at Al.
171 Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and
UK-style Conditional Fees, (Bern University Discussion Paper Series 04-07, 2004)
available at http://130.92.195.20/publikationen/download/dp0407.pdf.
172 Freedman, supra note 162.
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pre-trial discovery is allowed, although England is the only EU member
state to permit discovery. 
1 73
In 2005, Germany passed a law that allows for a "model case
procedure" to handle mass capital market proceedings. 74 This is different
from American class actions in that claims can only be brought by known
persons; thus opting-out is not permitted. In addition, although the
plaintiffs can share the costs of the model case ruling, the loser pays rule
applies. 171
While Asian markets are beginning to emerge as a major
competitor for IPO listings, private securities litigation risks are much less
significant in Asia than in the U.S. This has been due to factors which
include a lack of political support (as evidenced by China where securities
class action defendants are often proxies for the central government), 176 a
lack of procedural mechanisms, and a prevalence of the concentrated
shareholder model which in turn discourages minority shareholder
protections.
In Taiwan, for example, group litigation is "difficult and
unusual."' 177 Until the early 1990s, group litigation was suppressed due to
political factors. However, political agendas aside, Taiwanese securities
class actions are not much of a threat to issuers because of high
coordination costs, information costs, court costs, and a lack of procedural
laws. Plaintiffs must "opt-in" to collective litigation, limiting litigation to
specific, known parties resulting in high coordination costs. There is no
civil discovery procedure in Taiwan, adding to information seeking costs.
Exorbitantly high court fees further discourage Taiwanese securities
litigation, in that plaintiffs must advance court fees of up to 1% of the claim
at the district court and appellate levels, and 1.5% at the highest level of
appeal. 178 Although Taiwan does not have a "loser pays" rule, the losing
party is required to cover her own attorney's fees and court fees.179 With
such high court fees, it is easy to see how plaintiffs may be discouraged
from bringing group litigation.
173 Mark Wegener, Peter Fitzpatrick & Gregor Kleinknecht, Is European Dispute
Resolution Being Americanized, HOWREY LLP LITIGATION INTELLIGENCE EUROPE 2
(2005), available at www.howrey.com/docs/Lit Intelligence.pdf.
174 German Ministry of Justice, The German "Capital Markets Model Case Act,"
available at www.bmj.bund.de/media/archive/ I 056.pdf.
175 id.
176Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About
China's Legal System?, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 599, 638-39 (2003).
177 Lawrence S. Liu, Simulating Securities Class Actions: The Case in Taiwan 4
(Working Paper Series, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-251224.
178 Id. at 5.
179 id.
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South Korea's litigation regime is interesting to consider because
South Korea adopted a securities class action law in January 2004 that to
some extent emulates U.S. class actions.180 The Act recently had a
minimum asset size requirement of $1.67 billion that in effect exposed only
those Korean companies with the largest market capitalization to
liability. 181 However, this asset cap expired on January 1, 2007, so that
smaller companies now also face class actions.182  The small market
capitalization landscape of South Korea makes widespread class action
litigation unlikely because there are fewer potential securities class action
targets in South Korea than are available in the U.S. For example, after
Samsung Electronics, a company that possesses a market capitalization that
represents 20% of the market capitalization of all listed companies in South
Korea, there is a sharp dropoff in companies with large market
capitalization. Lastly, the country also lacks a well developed securities
plaintiffs' bar, large institutional investors, and a business-experienced
judiciary.
Private securities litigation in China is literally in its infancy,
largely because of the state dominated ownership of many companies in
China. Although the new 2006 Chinese Company law provides a broad
private right of action for private shareholders to bring suits, class actions
and contingency fees are not permitted in China."8 3 A 2002 Supreme
People's Court of China decree lifted a temporary ban on private
shareholder litigation but also imposed several significant limitations. One
such limitation is a requirement that an administrative actor sitting as a trial
level judge issue an "administrative penalty decision" before the courts can
hear a case, leaving the courts' function as simply deciding whether
damages are warranted, and at what amount.184 Furthermore, cases are
heard in the domicile of the defendant corporation, meaning that in practice
the local government ends up being a defendant in a court whose judges it
has appointed.
B. Recommendations for Modifying Private Securities Litigation
The committees' recommendations include some proposals with
respect to Rule lOb-5 which some in the press characterized as an attack on
Rule 1Ob-5. The New York Times, for example, reported that "an adviser
to the Paulson Committee [John Coffee]. . .recommended that the SEC
adopt the exception to Rule 1Ob-5 so that only the commission could bring
180 Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions 50 (UC Berkeley Public
Law Research Paper No. 528145, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-528145.
11 Id. at 67.
182 id.
183 Hutchens, supra note 176, at 601.
184 Id. at 635.
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such lawsuits against corporations."' 185 However, in a response to this and
similar reports, the same adviser responded that the proposal was actually
much more modest.18 6  Rather than remove the possibility of private
litigation, the committee reports recommend repairing the "dysfunctional"
class action system. 187
The reports raise procedural and substantive concerns with private
securities litigation and Rule 10b-5. The procedural concerns all reflect a
concern that securities litigation unfairly punishes companies while
inadequately compensating victims. One manifestation of this problem is
the circularity of securities class actions. In the words of Coffee,
"Fundamentally, shareholders are suing shareholders. As a result,
diversified shareholders wind up making pocket-shifting wealth transfers to
themselves."18 8 Coffee notes that the actual culprits of the fraud-typically
management-do not usually contribute to the settlement. Instead, these
costs are borne by the issuer and its current shareholders and the directors'
and officers' liability (D&O) insurer. Further, the less sophisticated,
undiversified "buy and hold" investors will seldom fall within a class
period, nor will they be able to even out their litigation losses (if such
"evening out" is possible given the 20-30% contingency fee collected by
the plaintiffs' attorneys) with recoveries from other claims from trades in a
class period. To counteract these problems, Coffee suggests that "[t]he
basic goal should be to move, at least marginally, from a system of entity
liability to a system of managerial and agent liability that placed the costs
instead on the culpable."' 8 9 One way to accomplish this would be for "the
SEC to adopt an exemptive rule under §36 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 that would shield a non-trading public corporation from liability for
monetary damages under Rule 10b-5,"'190 which would leave 1Ob-5 as it
currently operates in most cases, but for other cases (including the most
catastrophic cases like Enron and WorldCom, in which the issuer was
bankrupt) "would force the plaintiffs bar to sue and settle with corporate
officers and agents-i.e., auditors, underwriters, and law firms-instead of
treating the corporate entity as the deep pocket that paid everything."' 9'
Although Coffee envisions increased recovery from culpable
individuals and entities, it is important to note that neither Coffee nor the
Interim Report suggests facilitating 10b-5 actions against professional
185 Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection on Legal Front, N.Y.TiMES, Oct.
29, 2006, at 1.
186 John C. Coffee, Jr. Capital Market Competitiveness and Securities Litigation, NEW
YORK LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 16 2006, at 5.
187 id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
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service firms such as lawyers, underwriters and accountants by allowing
1 Ob-5 suits based on "scheme liability." Under this liability theory,
recently offered by the SEC, a plaintiff could recover against firms that
"engage with the corporation in a transaction whose principal purpose and
effect is to create a false appearance of revenues, intending to deceive
investors in the corporation's stock."' 192 Note that such a test does not
require that the firm's own conduct demonstrate a deceptive purpose and
effect.
The Chamber of Commerce Report calls attention to scheme
liability, supporting the Eighth Circuit's Charter Communications holding
that:
any defendant who does not make or affirmatively cause to be
made a fraudulent misstatement or omission, or who does not
directly engage in manipulative securities trading practices, is at
most guilty of aiding and abetting and cannot be held liable under §
10(b) or any subpart of Rule lOb-5. . . . To impose [scheme]
liability . . . would introduce potentially far-reaching duties and
uncertainties for those engaged in day-to-day business dealings. 193
While the Chamber of Commerce suggests that the SEC move away from
its support of scheme liability, the point is perhaps now moot because the
Supreme Court recently granted cert to a case, Stoneridge Investment
Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., raising questions about aider and
abettor liability under Section 10(b). Specifically, the question presented
was:
Whether this Court's decision in Central Bank, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), forecloses claims for
deceptive conduct under 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 where Respondents engaged in transactions with a public
corporation with no legitimate business or economic purpose
except to inflate artificially the public corporation's financial
statements, but where Respondents themselves made no public
statements concerning these transactions. 194
Securities litigation may also unfairly punish companies because
under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 308-"Fair Funds for Investors"-the SEC
is granted the authority to order that civil penalties obtained from a
defendant be added to a fund used to compensate victims of the securities
fraud. 19  However, the Interim Report points out that "there are nolimitations on recoveries in concurrent, private lawsuits even after the SEC
192 Brief of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae in Simpson v.
Homestore.com, Inc., 9th Cir., No. 04-55665 (October 22, 2004).
193 In re Charter Communications, Inc. Securities Litigation, 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir.
2006).
194 Quotation of Questions Presented available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/06-00043qp.pdf (internal citations omitted).
195 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006).
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has made a Fair Funds distribution, raising the possibility of a wasteful
double-recovery by shareholders that would undermine the original purpose
of Section 308 by permitting overcompensation and, likewise, over-
deterrence." 1
96
Finally, the Interim Report suggests that the SEC prohibit "pay-to-
play" practices among plaintiffs' firms. Prior to the passage of the PSLRA,
many suits were brought by professional plaintiffs who owned only a few
shares of many different companies. These plaintiffs worked in a symbiotic
relationship with plaintiffs' firms-the firms had a plaintiff already at hand,
and the plaintiff was compensated by the firm for their willing participation
in the suits. The PSLRA works to counteract this possibility by creating a
presumption that the potential plaintiff with the largest amount of damages
should be the lead plaintiff in the action. However, since public pension
funds are often the presumptive plaintiff, a new practice has developed,
whereby plaintiffs' firms will make contributions to the campaigns or
parties of the state officials who select the law firm. Then, "[p]ossibly in
return, the elected official picks the law firm as the pension fund's class
counsel when the fund elects to serve as lead plaintiff."', 97 Without naming
names, the Interim Report cites an example of "a leading plaintiffs' law
firm [that] contributed $100,000 to a state comptroller's campaign, and
senior partners at the firm made additional contributions. Shortly after
winning re-election, the comptroller appointed the contributing law firm to
represent the state's public-employee pension fund in a shareholder class
action lawsuit." 198
The Interim Report suggests a remedy similar to a rule used in the
regulation of municipal bonds: Rule G-37 of the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board mandates that an investment bank making a political
contribution to any elected official may not underwrite the municipal bonds
of the political subdivision of such official. 199 Similarly, the Interim Report
recommends that "[w]hen political contributions are made by lawyers to
individuals in charge of a state or municipal pension fund, the attorneys
should not be permitted to represent the fund as a lead plaintiff in a
securities class action. 2 °°
The committees also raise substantive concerns with lOb-5
litigation, focusing on the lack of predictability of the rule. The Interim
Report notes that "considerable uncertainty exists about many of the
elements of Rule 1Ob-5 liability as a result of conflicting interpretations by
196 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3 at 82.
197 Id. at 83.
198 Id.
199 MSRB Rule G-37, http://www.msrb.org/msrbl/rules/ruleg37.htm.
200 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 84.
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courts., 201 The Interim Report recommends that the SEC provide guidance
in three areas: materiality, scienter and reliance.20 2
As the Interim Report notes, there is conflict between the Ninth and
Third Circuit Courts on whether a disclosed misrepresentation is
"immaterial" as a matter of law if it does not produce any effects on the
market, with the Ninth Circuit answering in the negative and the Third in
203the affirmative. There is also a split between the Second and Ninth
Circuits on scienter, with the Second Circuit requiring plaintiffs to establish
a strong inference of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant, as
required by the Second Circuit, or merely "deliberate recklessness," as
required by the Ninth Circuit. 2° 4 Finally, the Interim Report recommends
that "the SEC ... clarify use of the fraud-on-the-market theory by defining
more sharply the circumstances under which a plaintiff is excused from
proving reliance on the defendant's alleged material misstatement or
,,205
omission.
While these recommendations will certainly provide a more
predictable litigation environment in the U.S., it does not seem certain that
the SEC would give guidance on substantive 1 Ob-5 interpretations, despite
having itself promulgated the Rule. Although the SEC has occasionally
given guidance into a similar area-when it clarified the scope of the
misappropriation theory of insider trading through Rule 1 0b5-2-it is not
clear that the SEC would step into an area which, in contrast to the
misappropriation theory, is relatively rich in case law. The SEC may be
less willing to step between two circuit courts in an area of law that seems
disposed to Supreme Court review than it would be to set out interpretations
of a new rule. Substantive changes are perhaps more likely to come from
the Supreme Court, Congress, or both, than from the SEC, although the
SEC could certainly play a role as amicus curiae and an advocate to
Congress with respect to these issues.
With respect to the procedural changes that would limit or
eliminate suits against a non-trading company, prohibit pay-to-play
practices, and limit the amount of damages recoverable through class
actions when the SEC provides victim compensation with funds obtained
through a Fair Funds remedy, all of these likely would, if not as a matter of
statutory construction than as a matter of political expediency, require
Congressional action, rather than SEC action as suggested by the Interim
Report. Because lOb-5 is an SEC rule, a limitation imposed by the SEC on
201 Id. at 80.
202 id.
203 Compare No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W.
Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003) with Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275,
282 (3d Cir. 2000).
204 Compare Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 102
(2000) with In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Lit., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999).
205 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 81.
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suits against the issuer would fall within the SEC's exemptive authority.20 6
But such a significant change by the SEC, however worthwhile, seems
unlikely. Following an undoubtedly acrimonious public review and
comment period, the SEC would certainly find itself in court defending a
rule that would be presented by the claimants as a betrayal of the SEC's
investor protection mandate. As a general observation regarding the
committees' procedural recommendations, while producing procedural
rules through the SEC framework would almost certainly be easier than
trying to get similar rules through Congress (as amendments to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, for example), the political significance of
Rule 10b-5 and the class action mechanism practically compels
Congressional action.
C. Auditor Liability Caps
Both the Interim Report and the Chamber of Commerce Report
suggest protection of auditors from "catastrophic" judgments. A
frequently-heard solution (from the committees and other sources) to this
danger is to adopt legislation that places a cap on auditor liability to civil
damages. According to the Wall Street Journal, this kind of auditor
protection is being "championed" by the Paulson Committee. 207 Under
such legislation, auditor liability to damages in a civil suit would be capped
in much the same way as some states place a cap on physician malpractice
liability. In recent statements made at the Economic Club of New York,
Secretary Paulson suggested that the Bush Administration was sympathetic
to proposals protecting auditors from civil and criminal liability.20 8
The argument for auditor liability caps has been advanced by the
"Big Four" public accounting firms in the U.S., who argue that it is merely
a matter of time before one of the firms is put out of business by way of a
large damages award. 20 9 The auditing firms argue that they are unable to
obtain sufficient insurance to cover the risk of a damages award, in part
because "in a worst case scenario," damages could potentially climb as high
as "the total stock market value of the companies they audit.
' 2 10
However, critics have argued that auditor liability caps are
unnecessary, pointing to the fact that the number of class action lawsuits
naming auditors as defendants has steadily decreased between 2002 and
206 See John Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay On Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV 1534, 1582-83 (2006).
207 David Reilly, Booming Audit Firms Seek Shield From Suits, WALL ST.J., Nov. 1,
2006, at C1.
208 Stephen Labaton, Treasury Chief Urges Balance in Regulation of US. Companies,
N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at C1.
209 Reilly, supra note 207.
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2005, from fourteen suits to five. 21 1  Furthermore, critics allude to the fact
that during the wave of accounting scandals and lawsuits of the early 2000s,
no auditors suffered a deathblow by way of civil damages. Arthur
Anderson LLP, the only national auditing firm to fall, met its end at the
212hands of a criminal obstruction of justice conviction.
Despite the predictable rhetoric on both sides of the issue, the
potential effectiveness of auditor liability caps in reducing litigation risk
lies somewhere between the lines. Auditor liability caps can likely be
helpful in reducing litigation risk against auditors, and to this extent they
may be a partial solution to the overall litigation climate in the U.S.
However, auditor liability caps alone cannot solve the problem. While
auditor caps may help lower the number of auditors listed in securities class
action lawsuits, no one has yet suggested that liability caps will lower the
total number of class action suits filed. Even if caps are instituted, it is
arguable that auditors will continue to be listed in securities class actions
for the simple fact that they may be the only deep pockets available for a
plaintiff to pursue when a fraudulent issuer goes bankrupt. So while
potentially a step in the right direction, auditor liability caps alone cannot
solve the problem.
In sum, U.S. litigation risk has been, and likely will continue to be,
an immensely significant factor in foreign listing decisions. Consideration
of the above-mentioned American securities class action data sheds light on
the significant possibility that litigation risk in the U.S. may frighten away
foreign issuers. Although data suggests that foreign firms are not subject to
litigation at higher rates than their American counterparts, this fact is of
little solace to foreign issuers due to the great amount of securities litigation
present in the U.S. While it remains to be seen whether the 2005 drop-off
in securities class action filings leads to long-term decline in U.S. securities
litigation, the fact remains that securities class action activity has risen
steadily in ten out of eleven of the years since the enactment of the PSLRA.
Furthermore, average settlement values have skyrocketed.
While the fact that European countries have been moving towards a
U.S. style class action litigation system is interesting, in the short term it is
also unlikely to have any significant impact on how foreign issuers balance
litigation risks at home versus the risks of listing in the U.S. Though
foreign countries have shown a willingness to adopt various parts of the
U.S. class action system, at the present time no country has adopted the
kinds of procedural and structural mechanisms that have led to the
development of the class action culture in the U.S., including a dedicated
plaintiffs' bar. As U.S. class action lawyer Michael Hausfield notes with
respect to the UK, "there's no such thing as a claimant lawyer as opposed to
a defendant lawyer. Most firms in the UK will take both or either, unlike
211 Id.
212 id
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the US, where it clearly has a plaintiff bar and a defence bar." '2 13 Thus, any
convergence with the American securities class action culture will likely be
gradual.
Given the fact that private securities litigation risk in the U.S. likely
plays such a significant role in foreign listings decisions, plans for so called
"tort reform" or the passage of more limited measures like auditor liability
caps may be where a potential solution lies. However, whether the
currently Democratic legislature has the political will to pass such
legislation remains to be seen. For now, private securities litigation looks
to continue to pose an ongoing threat to foreign IPO activity in the U.S.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the current atmosphere of heated rhetoric surrounding
Sarbanes-Oxley, it is clear that the U.S. competitiveness problem runs
much deeper than the passage of the Act. As others have noted, we see
litigation risk as the problem most likely to affect a listing decision for
foreign companies. The higher burdens imposed through Sarbanes-Oxley
have a greater impact on the listing decision for smaller U.S. issuers,
although the SEC is already working to alleviate some of the difficulties
created by Section 404. As we witness the anxiety caused by the capital
flight to other markets (both private and foreign) and the numerous
recommendations for reform, we note two reminders that an informed,
measured approach to the concerns of capital markets competitiveness may
be in order. The first may be seen with the 1980s consternation regarding
the Japanese Keiretsu system. The perceived superiority of the Japanese
"big bank" finance capitalism system led to a call for the adoption of a
similar system in the U.S.; ultimately these proposals were silenced by a
booming American economy of the 1990s while Japan's economy
struggled.214
The second is a recent pair of reports in the Financial Times. In
one, the paper notes that the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the UK's
primary financial services regulator, "gave the first official recognition of
intensifying City concern about the impact some overseas listings are
having on the standards and reputation of London., 21 5  The FSA is
213 Jon Robins, Michael Hausfield brings class actions to the UK, The Lawyer.com
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concerned that investors are not being adequately informed of certain
companies' choice of "light-touch listing methods, which can offer
investors less protection. ', 216 The FSA also announced that "it was calling
for a formal debate about the balance between attracting new flotations and
maintaining quality. 217  In a related article, the Financial Times online
edition also reported that "a storm of protest from shareholders, politicians,
consumer groups and investment trusts has prompted the Financial Services
Authority to scrap a new light-touch regulatory regime designed to attract
hedge funds to list in London. ' ,218 While the US wonders if the pendulum
has swung too far in favor of regulation designed to protect investors, the
UK wonders if its light-touch regime will fail to protect investors by
encouraging a market for lemons.
Recent times have seen steps towards a convergence in corporate
law, class action litigation procedures, and accounting standards. World
capital markets are merging, and it appears that international barriers to
capital flow are destined to fall. As the world's economic landscape
changes, our regulatory systems must change as well. Nevertheless,
regulatory changes should only be made after slow and thoughtful
consideration. If anything, the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley has shown that
we cannot merely regulate our way to happiness.
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